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Teaching de raptu meo: Chaucer, Chaumpaigne, 
and Consent in the Classroom
Anna Waymack
On May 1, 1380 one Cecily Chaumpaigne released Geoffrey Chaucer 
from omnimodas acciones tam de raptu meo tam de aliqua alia re vel causa.1 
On May 4 she had it copied onto the Close Rolls.
2
 The document cites 
Sir William Beauchamp (the chamberlain of the king’s household), 
Sir John Clanvowe, Sir William Neville, Sir John Philipot (member of 
Parliament and, in 1378, lord mayor of London), and Richard Morel as 
witnesses; these were important friends of Chaucer. Three days after 
that, Chaumpaigne’s statement was recopied as a memorandum in the 
Court of King’s Bench—but with a key change. The phrase de raptu meo 
was removed, replaced with a release omnimodas acciones tam de feloniis 
transgressionibus compotis debitis quam aliis accionibus quibuscumque.3 
1. “all manner of actions related to my rape, or to whatever other situation 
or cause,” in Martin M. Crow and Clair C. Olson, eds., Chaucer Life-Records 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1966), 343.
2. Close Roll 219, 3 Ric. II, m. 9d. F. J. Furnivall introduced this memo-
randum to Chaucerians in The Athenæum 2405 (29 November 1873): 698–99. 
3. KB 27/477 m. 58d (coram rege roll, Easter term 3 Ric. II). “all manner of 
actions either related to felonies, trespasses, accounts, debts, or whatever 
other actions.” Christopher Cannon discovered and transcribed in full this 
additional memorandum in “Raptus and the Chaumpaigne Release and a 
Newly Discovered Document Concerning the Life of Geoffrey Chaucer,” 
Speculum 68, no. 1 (1993): 74–94, 89–90, doi:10.2307/2863835. The omission 
of de raptu meo is not the only change; the 7 May copy does not list 
Philippott and Morel by name. Richard Firth Green hypothesizes that the 
difference reflects two original quitclaims, each copied, rather than a single 




original release most likely remained in Chaucer’s possession and 
is now lost to us. We have two subsequent legal entries from 20 June 
1380. In one, Richard Goodchild and John Grove “remitted, released, and 
quitclaimed” Chaucer.
4
 In the other, following Goodchild and Grove’s 
release of Chaucer, Chaumpaigne released Goodchild and Grove. A final 
entry, from 2 July 1380, records that Grove owed and paid by Michaelmas 
a £10 debt to Chaumpaigne.
5
The most frequently drawn conclusions are as follows. First, although 
raptus could refer to a range of crimes including abduction, in this par-
ticular context and time and in reference to a grown woman it most likely 
meant sexual assault.
6
 Second, generally implicit rather than explicit is 
Chaucer: A New Look at an Old Dispute,” in Law and Sovereignty in the 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance, ed. Robert S. Sturges (Turnhout: Brepols, 
2011), 270, doi:10.1484/M.ASMAR-EB.1.100014.
4. City of London, Records, Pleas and Memoranda, A. 23 m. 5b. Copied 
in full in Crow and Olson, Chaucer Life-Records, 344–45.
5. Reginald Sharpe, The Athenæum 3642 (14 August 1897): 226.
6. For some of the extensive discussion on whether raptus in this case 
would have meant rape or, potentially, abduction instead, cf. Christopher 
Cannon, “Chaucer and Rape: Uncertainty’s Certainties,” in Representing Rape 
in Medieval and Early Modern Literature, ed. Elizabeth Robertson and 
Christine M. Rose (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001), 82, in which Cannon 
argues that medieval law’s conflation of abduction and rape renders our 
hopes of excusing the latter through the possibility of the former is anachro-
nistic and symptomatic of our own anxieties about rape and Chaucer. 
Corinne Saunders urges caution in reading Chaumpaigne’s case as rape, given 
“the blurred semantic field of raptus,” in “The Medieval Law of Rape,” King’s 
Law Journal 11, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 19–48, 19. Derek Pearsall finds the use 
of raptus alone as indicative of rape in The Life of Geoffrey Chaucer: A Critical 
Biography (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 135–38. Cf. Richard Firth Green, 
“Cecily Champain v. Geoffrey Chaucer,” 261–85; Henry Ansgar Kelly, 
“Meanings and Uses of Raptus in Chaucer’s Time,” Studies in the Age of 
Chaucer 20 (1998): 101–65; Martha Powell Harley, “Geoffrey Chaucer, Cecilia 
Chaumpaigne, and Alice Perrers: A Closer Look,” Chaucer Review 28, no. 1 
(1993–94), 78–82, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25095830; Sheila Delany, 
“Strategies of Silence in the Wife of Bath’s Recital,” Exemplaria 2 (1990): 
49–69, reprinted in Medieval Literary Politics: Shapes of Ideology 
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the assumption in our biographies of Chaucer that sexual intercourse 
(consensual or otherwise) occurred between Chaumpaigne and Chau-
cer. Third, that money changed hands from Goodchild and Grove 
to Chaumpaigne and then from Chaucer to Goodchild and Grove in 
repayment. Finally, as evident through the high status of his witnesses, 
Chaucer did not take the charge of raptus as a trivial matter.7 From these 
points, the documents, and his own works we have put Chaucer on an 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 128; Martin M. Crow and 
Virginia B. Leland, “Chaucer’s Life,” in The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry D. 
Benson, 3
rd
 ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), xxi–xxii; P. R. 
Watts, “The Strange Case of Geoffrey Chaucer and Cecilia Chaumpaigne,” 
Law Quarterly Review 63 (1947): 491–515; T. F. T. Plunkett argues for raptus 
here meaning rape in “Chaucer’s Escapade,” Law Quarterly Review 64 (1948): 
33–36. Crow and Olson note that in two other cases of raptus familiar to 
Chaucer, those of his father John Chaucer’s childhood abduction and Isabella 
Hall’s abduction in which Chaucer was a justice ad inquirendum, the phrase 
used is rapuerunt et abduxerunt. See Chaucer Life-Records, 345 for their 
commentary, 3 for John Chaucer, and 375–83 for the Isabella Hall case.
For more on the context surrounding raptus, see Caroline Dunn, “The 
Language of Ravishment in Medieval England,” Speculum 86, no. 1 (2011): 
79–116, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41105501; Barbara A. Hanawalt, “Whose 
Story Was This? Rape Narratives in Medieval English Courts,” in Of Good 
and Ill Repute: Gender and Social Control in Medieval England (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 124–41, and Crime and Conflict in English 
Communities, 1300–1348 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 
104–10; and Corinne Saunders’s coverage of the legal developments of raptus 
in England over the fourteenth century, “The Medieval Law of Rape,” 37–38. 
She observes that there was, “an increasing legal concern over the crime of 
raptus,” along with a shift in focus to the harm to the victim’s family rather 
than the victim. She also notes if a woman without a guardian (like 
Chaumpaigne) wished to exercise her right of appeal, she was responsible for 
not only displaying physical evidence to a legal officer within forty days, but 
also the appeal, accusation, and proof. She would have small odds of success 
and even smaller odds of obtaining any sentence beyond a fine.
7. Joseph Allen Hornsby covers Chaucer’s legal and literary usages of 
raptus and related terms in Chaucer and the Law (Norman, OK: Pilgrim 
Books, 1988), 115–20.
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unending posthumous trial. Chaumpaigne became an awkward footnote 
in teaching Chaucer, elusive but inescapable due to his constant literary 
return to nuances of consent. 
At an increasingly rapid pace, cultural and political events in the 
United States from 2011 onwards have driven Chaumpaigne to the center 
of our classroom discussions of Chaucer, rendering her terse retraction 
an emotional and political minefield.
8
 We are faced with reconciling 
the uncomfortable echoes in sexual assault accusations against a presi-
dent who boasts of grabbing women “by the pussy” with the account 
in Chaucer’s Miller’s Tale of Hende of Nicholas catching Alisoun “by 
the queynte.”
9
 We are further faced with students whose discourse on 
consent, false rape accusations, rape culture, and believing sexual assault 
survivors is to an unprecedented degree already polarized and openly 
personalized. This setup cannot only direct the entirety of the class’s 
time away from the text, but can provoke conflicts perceived as personal 
attacks that dampen participation in subsequent classes. To add to these 
difficulties, existing resources are likely to exacerbate these dynamics. 
Despite articles by Christopher Cannon, Susan Signe Morrison and 
others, as well as the Chaucer Life-Records, the relevant Chaumpaigne 
documents are not collected and translated in their entirety in any single 
8. I do not wish, with this piece, to write over Tison Pugh, “Chaucer’s 
Rape, Southern Racism, and the Pedagogical Ethics of Authorial 
Malfeasance,” College English 67, no. 6 (2005): 569–86, 
doi:10.2307/30044653; Karen Robertson, “Discussing Rape in the 
Classroom,” Medieval Feminist Newsletter 9 (Summer 1990): 21–22; or 
Christine M. Rose, “Reading Chaucer Reading Rape,” in Representing Rape 
in Medieval and Early Modern Literature, ed. Elizabeth Robertson and 
Christine M. Rose (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001), 21–60. On the contrary, 
I am heavily indebted to each of them. What I hope to do in large part is 
update their work to account for a cultural sea change between 2013 and 
2017. Robertson addresses unexpected interjections from rape survivors in 
the classroom, while Rose considers how we simultaneously read both the 
metaphorical uses of rape in Chaucer’s works and the very real and gendered 
violence replicated therein. 
9. I (A) 3272, 3276. All Chaucer quotations borrowed from The Riverside 
Chaucer, ed. Benson.
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resource appropriate for advanced high school students or introductory 
college courses.
10
 Moreover, much of the biographical speculation about 
Chaumpaigne’s family, character, motives, and reproductive history with 
Chaucer anachronistically plasters modern rape culture narratives over 
this medieval case.
Nevertheless, in this web of voices and victims is an acute opportu-
nity for medievalists to showcase the relevance of their literature and 
demand intensive mental engagement from students. Chaumpaigne’s 
retraction offers a vantage point from which students can critically 
examine the gendered dynamics of not only the fourteenth century but 
also the twenty-first. It highlights the violence against women woven 
throughout the canon and provides neither side of the debate with easy 
answers, either about the case itself or about the implications for/within 
Chaucer’s literary output. If presented as a case that cannot be tried in 
absentia, Chaumpaigne’s retraction can push students to consider but side 
step the parallels with currently trending rape accusations in favor of a 
deeper look at underlying power structures, criteria for credibility and 
importance (or, conversely, systems through which voices are silenced 
or transmuted), and the literature itself. Recent events in educational 
and feminist policies, media coverage of sexual assault, and the current 
political situation are strongly influencing students’ preconceptions and 
ideologies. These developments, the potential for discussions to turn 
vicious, and the gulf between students’ lexicons and existing scholarly 
resources have led me to create for pedagogic purposes a digital primer 
on the Chaumpaigne documents.
On 4 April 2011 the United States Department of Education’s Office 
for Civil Rights published what is commonly termed the “Dear Col-
league Letter.”
11
 It deemed sexual harassment and violence on cam-
puses to be hindrances to students’ rights to an education free from 
10. The Chaucer Life-Records contains all but the 7 May release, but does 
not translate any of its documents. Nor does it give context for, e.g., the 
import of the Close Rolls or the value of the payments at stake.
11. US Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, “Dear Colleague 
Letter,” by Russlynn Ali, significant guidance document (Washington, DC, 





 It therefore labeled them forms of sex discrimination 
prohibited by Title IX, part of the United States Education Amendments 
Act of 1972, which states, “No person in the United States shall, on the 
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”
13
 The “Dear Colleague 
Letter” cited the standard statistic that approximately one in five women 
experience attempted or successful sexual assault during college, along 
with about six percent of men.
14
 It addressed schools’ specific obliga-
tions in reducing sexual violence, including grievance procedures.
15
 For 
these, it prescribed a lower standard of evidence than that for criminal 
complaints, the “preponderance of evidence” standard applied by the 
Supreme Court in prior civil rights litigation, so as to make the griev-
ance procedures equitable between the complainant and respondent.
16
 
A rebuttal to the lower standard of evidence has been that false “con-
victions” from universities cause the defendant substantial harm. This is 
inarguable. However, such convictions are less consequential than con-
victions in criminal or civil courts. Criminal courts can strip defendants 
12. Ibid., 1.
13. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, U.S. Code 20 (1972), § § 
1681 et seq. See also the implementing regulations, Code of Federal 
Regulations, 34 § 106.
14. “Dear Colleague Letter,” 2. The letter does not address rates of sexual 
assault among genderqueer students. For the study it cites, see Christopher P. 
Krebs et al., The Campus Sexual Assault Study: Final Report (Rockland, MD: 
National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 2007), xiii and 5-5, http://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf. 
15. “Dear Colleague Letter,” 4.
16. Ibid., 10–11. As context, “preponderance of the evidence” may be 
roughly summarized as “more likely than not.” This differs from the 
common criminal court standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt” and that 
applied in some cases to either criminal court proceedings or civil courts in 
which financial damages may be sought, “clear and convincing,” which falls 
between “preponderance of the evidence” and “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
Preponderance of the evidence is the usual standard in civil cases. See Ann 
Olivarius’s article in this collection.
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of liberty or even life. Civil courts can impose money damages or forbid 
defendants from certain actions. Universities at most expel respondents, 
costing them their invested time and money and their access to that uni-
versity. The remainder of the costs—job access, social media reputation, 
difficulties applying to future academic programs—is not an official part 
of a university sanction, and could and do happen after a criminal case, 
civil case, or no conviction or case at all.
17
 So in requiring schools to 
make available these grievance procedures as a non-exclusive alternative 
to the notorious difficulty of securing a rape conviction in criminal court, 
the Department of Education attempted to balance the lopsided nature 
of what are often “he-said, she-said” cases and to calibrate the standard 
of evidence to both precedent (other sections of the Civil Rights Act) 
and the possible sanctions for the accused (at most, expulsion from the 
institution). Instead, they initiated an ongoing national conversation on 
false accusations and the credibility of rape survivors.
18
In 2013, Andrea L. Pino and Annie E. Clark jumpstarted an anti-rape 
feminist movement on campuses. They pored over the existing Title 
IX civil rights legislation and the “Dear Colleague Letter.” Along with 
other women, they used Title IX and the Clery Act to hold their uni-
versity accountable for its handling of sexual assault allegations between 
students.
19
 Their activism, and the wave of similar activism following it, 
17. In this way consequences are pegged to certainty. Depriving someone 
of life or liberty requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Depriving them 
of property—and, worse, freedom of action—requires a preponderance of 
evidence. Although this idea is not being argued for here or elsewhere, 
Nathaniel Mercer Stetson and I speculate that to be truly proportionate, 
depriving someone of their investment in a degree could require an even 
lower standard of proof. For example, businesses are known for firing 
employees “just in case.” 
18. For a starkly different take on the application of Title IX to universities 
during the Obama administration, cf. Robert David Johnson and Stuart 
Taylor, Jr., The Campus Rape Frenzy: The Attack on Due Process at America’s 
Universities (New York, NY: Encounter Books, 2017). 
19. Their account is recorded in a documentary on campus sexual assault: 
The Hunting Ground, directed by Kirby Dick (Los Angeles, CA: Chain 
Camera Pictures, 2015), film.
157
draws its energy from first-person representations, which they use to 
reclaim voices, destigmatize the experience of sexual assault, and draw 
attention to the unfortunate prevalence of rape. As a result, a surge of 
sexual assault survivors has spoken out for the first time. Pop artist Lady 
Gaga related her own experience in 2014, then brought a cohort of fel-
low rape survivors to perform “‘Til It Happens to You” with her at the 
2016 Oscars, where they were introduced by Vice President Joe Biden. 
Cementing “survivor” as an identity, several of the cohort obtained 
matching tattoos. Pino and Clark published a collection of survivors’ 
stories in 2016, titled We Believe You: Survivors of Campus Sexual Assault 
Speak Out.20
This anthology encapsulated three burgeoning trends: activist first-
person accounts of sexual assault, survivorship as an emotionally laden 
personal and academic identity, and the emerging radical “believe the 
victim” heuristic. It is with the first two of these three phenomena 
uncomfortably in mind, as well as my position bridging student and 
instructor, that I connect the following points. In 2014, The Nib pub-
lished the anonymous comic “Trigger Warning: Breakfast.”
21
 The comic 
addressed the narrator’s guilt at not fighting off her rapist and her frus-
tration with being a “confident and arrogant and unsympathetic . . . 
protagonist”: a bad victim. It centered on her attempt to change the story 
of the previous night by making her rapist breakfast. In her longest burst 
of text, the narrator wrote, “The next morning, I make him breakfast. If 
I didn’t say no, it’s just a romance. I made him breakfast because if I could 
make him breakfast—eggs, bacon, golden brown toast—I could pretend 
that it never happened. Women do not make their rapists breakfast, and 
I made breakfast.” She painted the agony of being complicit in her own 
invalidation through her survival strategy of invalidating the rape itself. 
In Chaucer’s Reeve’s Tale, the miller’s daughter Malyne was set upon 
in her sleep, unaware of the student Aleyn approaching her bed until 
20. Annie E. Clark and Andrea L. Pino, eds., We Believe You: Survivors of 
Campus Sexual Assault Speak Out (New York, NY: Holt Paperbacks, 2016).
21. The Nib, “Trigger Warning: Breakfast,” New York: First Look Media, 
8 July 2014, https://thenib.com/trigger-warning-breakfast-c6cdeec070e6. 
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it was “to late for to crie.”
22
 The next morning she sent Aleyn off with 
sweet words and a cake. As she ended her farewell to him, “almoost she 
gan to wepe.”
23
 Reading through, it is easy enough to ascribe this to the 
emotion of lovers parting. The story is not from her point of view; told 
by Chaucer through the figure of the Reeve, it follows Aleyn and his 
fellow clerk. Yet the actions Chaucer only just foreclosed, the cry and 
the weeping, warp this part of the tale into a brief glimpse at a more 
complex and dark experience.
24
I place “Trigger Warning: Breakfast” next to the Reeve’s Tale because 
I find it hard to read them as separate works. This is perhaps a damn-
ing confession for a Chaucerian, but a relevant one as a feminist peda-
gogue. Our academic analyses can be detached, but our instruction must 
acknowledge students’ personal challenges in accessing the material. 
And, I would even argue, our academic analyses can be informed by 
experiences. In 2013 I was writing my MA thesis on the Reeve’s Tale. I 
was in my own bed. I couldn’t cry out. I think I made him breakfast, 
to keep things smoother. Like many survivors’ memories, mine are 
fuzzy. I know I sounded choked up as I shooed him out with gentle, 
non-provoking words. And when I returned to Chaucer and Malyne, I 
froze. When I read “Trigger Warning: Breakfast,” I froze again. For a 
year following, when my professors and classmates would unexpectedly 
22. I (A) 4196.
23. I (A) 4248.
24. Heidi Breuer observes how in the Reeve’s Tale, “Chaucer’s construc-
tion of this scene forecloses any possibility except rape . . . [he] takes care to 
inform us why the hue and cry was not raised.” She goes much farther than I 
would in her critique of both the Reeve narrator and Chaucer’s (unaware?) 
complicity in reinforcing rape culture. I would push back that Malyne’s 
depiction evinces awareness of the complex responses of survivors, even as 
the Reeve narrator may show obliviousness. See Breuer, “Being Intolerant: 
Rape is Not Seduction (in ‘The Reeve’s Tale’ or Anywhere Else),” in The 
Canterbury Tales Revisited—21st Century Interpretations, ed. Kathleen A. 
Bishop (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008), 8. Cf. W.W. 
Allman and Dorrel Thomas Hanks, “Rough Love: Notes Towards an Erotics 
of the Canterbury Tales,” Chaucer Review 38, no. 1 (2003): 44–48, http://
www.jstor.org/stable/25094234.
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discuss issues of sexual assault in literature, I could not engage with the 
work. My breath shortened, my attention shattered and then hyper-
focused only on the woman’s perspective of the sexual assault, and the 
stakes of any discussion—if I were even able to still participate in the 
discussion—felt life-or-death. 
This textbook experience of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, a mental 
health disorder particularly prevalent among rape survivors, is at the core 
of trigger or content warnings. A content warning, as I use the term 
here, does not encourage evading engagement with a work but rather 
allows the student to prepare for the reading and the discussion. Advance 
notice lets one schedule difficult readings when best able to interact with 
them (e.g., our anonymous comic artist might not choose to read the 
Reeve’s Tale at breakfast) and come to class mentally ready. For those of 
us with PTSD, this means that the aftermath of the violence inflicted 
upon us does not prevent us from obtaining our education. For those 
without, the content warning still serves as a cautionary alert about 
challenging information and discussions, the equivalent of the roadside 
yellow warning sign.
Just as relevant as content warnings to teaching Cecily Chaumpaigne’s 
documents is the way in which the post-2013 campus framework around 
sexual assault has posited rape survivor as a (marginalized) identity. Stu-
dents are increasingly identifying themselves as such, both internally, 
with implications for their reading of texts, and externally, raising the 
likelihood of their sharing personal accounts in the classroom.
25
 Students 
in the position I occupied may well concurrently experience a PTSD 
25. Robertson, “Discussing Rape,” relates an experience teaching women’s 
studies majors in which a cascading group of rape survivors, ultimately 
totaling a fifth of her class, spoke up about the ways in which a literary rape 
triggered them and the ways in which their experiences changed their 
readings of the text (21). She notices that the voices of those survivors 
silenced their peers, but also writes, “I had not imagined that I could have so 
many rape survivors in the class” (22). One fifth of the classroom happens to 
be exactly in line with the 1 in 5 statistic on college women experiencing 
sexual assault. Where volunteering that information may have required a 
smaller, feminist class in 1990, I would suggest that current rape survivor 
students receive more impetus to speak up.
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trigger, identify strongly with the historical or fictional rape victim/
accuser, augment this identification by sharing some elements of their 
sexual assault in the classroom discussion, and read, in that fight-or-
flight state, a classmate’s dismissal of the possible rape as an attack on 
and denial of their own identity. Moreover, not every element of this 
equation must be present for that outcome to result.
In addition, the “believe the victim” heuristic frames discussion of 
rape accusations as an ideological matter. This heuristic has reached 
the pages of the New York Times and Washington Post, though it has 
not yet (to my knowledge) been applied in literary criticism.
26
 It is the 
radical act of believing the survivor. I choose this phrasing of radical and 
survivor to reflect how its proponents have styled it: a subversive and 
unusual move in a rape culture that routinely works to discredit victims. 
It is based in the disproportionate fears of false rape accusations and the 
claim that “[t]here is no privilege to being a survivor; there is nothing 
to gain from being raped.”
27
 It acknowledges both the real occurrence of 
false accusations and the accuracy problems endemic in the testimony of 
traumatized (and thus neurologically altered) survivors, emphasizing that 
“This is not a legal argument about what standards we should use in the 
courts; it’s a moral one, about what happens outside the legal system.”
28
It is tempting to apply that heuristic in cases such as Chaumpaigne’s, 
where we do not and never will have enough information to try the case 
by legal standards. “Believe the victim” counters our current default of 
saying that although we may believe sexual intercourse occurred between 
26. Wagatwe Wanjuki, “Believing Victims Is the First Step to Stopping 
Rape,” Room for Debate in New York Times, 12 December 2014, accessed 26 
November 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/12/12/
justice-and-fairness-in-campus-rape-cases/believing-victims-is-the-first-
step-to-stopping-rape; Zerlina Maxwell, “No Matter What Jackie Said, We 
Should Generally Believe Rape Claims,” Washington Post, 6 December 2014, 
accessed 26 November 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/postevery-
thing/wp/2014/12/06/no-matter-what-jackie-said-we-should-automatically-
believe-rape-claims. Cf. Roxanne Gay, “Nate Parker and the Limits of 
Empathy,” New York Times, 19 August 2016, accessed 19 May 2017. 
27. Wanjuki, “Believing Victims.” 
28. Maxwell, “No Matter What Jackie Said.”
161
Chaucer and Chaumpaigne, and that Chaucer regarded her subsequent 
charge of raptus as threatening enough to call in political favors, have 
the wording specifying rape removed from the more accessible record, 
and indirectly pay Chaumpaigne a substantial sum, we will never know 
what happened. This assessment is true; we will never know. It can also 
be accusatory or fatalistic in an environment where students’ own stories 
might have been dismissed as, ultimately, unknowable.
Yet Cecily nixed this approach. She was, in her own way, as slippery 
as Chaucer.
29
 We cannot blindly credit Chaumpaigne, because we do 
not have her accusation, only her retraction. We can point to the clear 
pressure being brought to bear on her through the social status of the 
witnesses against her and we can note the exchange of money, but we 
cannot escape the fact that whatever happened, she accepted certain 
terms, retracted the charge, and then went further and removed even 
the language of raptus.
Meanwhile, if campus concerns and feminist movements have found 
themselves mired in the issue of survivors’ credibility weighed against 
the harms of false accusations, so too have the media. In the wake of 
a publicized rape trial in Steubenville we began dissecting the media’s 
response in lamenting the “promising futures” of the defendants—teen-
aged football players—despite video footage of the assault.
30
 Social media 
and less prominent publications lambasted CNN, ABC News, NBC 
News, and the Associated Press for their sympathy for the defendants. 
A year later in November 2014, Rolling Stone published the immensely 
popular, provocative exposé “A Rape on Campus,” focusing on the 
way the University of Virginia mishandled a specific case involving 
29. I do feel obliged to point out the strangeness of biographies automati-
cally leaping to Chaucer’s defense when we are trained to read slydyng Chaucer 
skeptically, particularly in his “self ”-representations. This is an author valued 
for his cagey and elusive portraits, read by default through a hermeneutics of 
suspicion that pries at the space between Chaucer-the-author and Chaucer-
the-narrator and even—especially!—Chaucer-the-pilgim.
30. “Guilty Verdict in Steubenville Rape Trial; Matt Lauer Faults NBC; 
Iraq War Anniversary,” CNN, 11:00 ET 17 March 2013, http://transcripts.
cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1303/17/rs.01.html, accessed 9 December 2015.
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fraternities and alleged gang rape.
31
 Shortly after publication, the par-
ticulars of the accuser’s story began to fall apart, to the point where 
an embarrassed Rolling Stone commissioned the Columbia School of 
Journalism for an independent investigation into their self-described 
“failure of journalism.”
32
Despite this, outlets including the Guardian and Buzzfeed continue to 
shine a spotlight on sexual assault in higher education.
33
 A recent tipping 
point was a published letter from the anonymous victim of Brock Allen 
Turner, a Stanford student and athlete.
34
 It sparked outrage after media 
highlighted Turner’s derailed prospects and the judge, Aaron Persky, 
granted the convicted rapist a lenient sentence. Frustrated, thorough, and 
pained, it details the consequences for the survivor despite a successful 
conviction and reasonably perfect victimhood—multiple witnesses, no 
prior acquaintanceship, and clear incapacitation. News media now bal-
ances awareness of a flawed system of justice, concerns about unreliable 
accounts, and the countervailing worries of enabling and amplifying 
rape culture.
This media introspection on how we discuss a crime that is frequently 
presented as one person’s word against another’s has been fueling and 
31. Sabrina Erdely, “A Rape on Campus,” Rolling Stone, 19 November 
2014. [Retracted 5 April 2015.]
32. Will Dana, “Note from the Editor”; and Sheila Coronel, Steve Coll, 
and Derek Kravitz, “Rolling Stone and UVA: The Columbia University 
Graduate School of Journalism Report: An Anatomy of a Journalistic 
Failure,” Rolling Stone, 5 April 2015, http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/
features/a-rape-on-campus-what-went-wrong-20150405, accessed 6 
November 2015. 
33. While these may appear idiosyncratic choices, the Guardian and 
Buzzfeed have been consistently at the forefront of covering campus sexual 
assault.
34. Katie J. M. Baker, “Here Is The Powerful Letter The Stanford Victim 
Read Aloud To Her Attacker,” Buzzfeed, 3 June 2016, https://www.buzzfeed.
com/katiejmbaker/heres-the-powerful-letter-the-stanford-victim-read-to-
her-ra, accessed 20 January 2017. For the sake of clarity, Baker is not Turner’s 
victim but rather a reporter who has frequently worked on issues of sexual 
assault; the anonymous victim provided her statement to Baker and Buzzfeed.
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is being augmented by our renewed scrutiny of Hollywood. Both Bill 
Cosby and Woody Allen are on trial in the court of public opinion, with 
their accusers given prominent platforms. Dylan Farrow, Allen’s accuser, 
openly challenged our enjoyment of Allen’s art, beginning and ending 
an unsparing letter with “What’s your favorite Woody Allen movie?”
35
 
We have paid near-instantaneous critical attention to the narrative spins 
and purposes of a sudden glut of sexual assault in television, including 
in popular shows like Game of Thrones, Downton Abbey, Outlander, Mad 
Men, House of Cards, Orange Is the New Black, and Scandal. Jessica Jones 
and The Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt each made “rape survivor” a core 
identity of their titular protagonists.
On the other side of the polarized media, the issue of campus rape 
and academia’s responses has sparked rallying cries of feminist overreach. 
One prominent voice on this front, provocateur Milo Yiannopoulos, 
wrote tendentiously, “Moral panic about ‘rape culture’ has led to gross 
violations of due process against male students on campus, who can now 
be hauled before campus kangaroo courts to answer charges of sexual 
assault with no adequate legal representation and very low burdens of 
proof.”
36
 The fear of false rape accusations and the perceived ability of 
women to relabel sex they regret as rape became a politicized point of 
the alt-right.
This narrative of a regretful or vengeful woman manipulating a legal 
system with a false charge for her own ends is an enduring one, even 
enshrined in law at times.
37
 But a summary of studies examining trends 
in recognized false rape reports highlights that, “[d]espite the stereotype, 
35. Dylan Farrow, “An Open Letter From Dylan Farrow,” On the Ground 
in New York Times, 1 February 2014, https://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2014/02/01/an-open-letter-from-dylan-farrow, accessed 5 November 2015.
36. Milo Yiannopoulos, “Feminists and Progressives Attack College 
Football with More Dodgy Rape Statistics,” Breitbart, 6 January 2016, 
http://www.breitbart.com/sports/2016/01/06/feminists-and-progressives-
attack-college-football-with-more-dodgy-rape-statistics/, accessed 15 
January 2017.
37. David Lisak, Lori Gardinier, Sara C. Nicksa and Ashley M. Cote, 
“False Allegations of Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten Years of Reported 
Cases,” Violence Against Women 16, no. 12 (2010): 1319.
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false reports of sexual assault are not typically filed by women trying 
to ‘get back at a boyfriend’ or cover up a pregnancy, affair, or other 
misbehavior. While there are examples of this kind of false report, the 




One motive behind this misperception seems to be our insistence on 
viewing rapists as Other, as the stranger lurking in the dark parking lot, 
presenting cognitive dissonance when someone central to our cultural 
self-image is accused—such as a football player, or the father of Eng-
lish literature. This ignores the fact that the accusation of a stranger or 
unknown assailant rather than an acquaintance or friend is considered 
a red flag of a potentially false rape accusation. Meanwhile, the overall 
percentage of false rape accusations is routinely estimated at between 
two and ten percent, in line with false accusations of other violent 
crimes.
39
 We cannot, of course, responsibly extrapolate the low rates of 
false accusation from the twenty-first century to the fourteenth. We can, 
however, bear in mind this dynamic from our current rape culture.
40
 
The combination of The Department of Education’s work on campus 
rape under the Obama administration, the feminist “believe the victim” 
creed and first-person narratives, and the conservative pushback against 
these movements came to a head during the 2016 presidential race. 
Women publicized high-profile accusations of sexual assault on both 
sides. Donald Trump brought three women accusing his opponent’s hus-
band of sexual assault—Paula Jones, Juanita Broaddrick, and Kathleen 
Willey—to a press conference before the second presidential election 
38. Kimberly A. Lonsway, Joanne Archambault, and David Lisak, “False 
Reports: Moving Beyond the Issue to Successfully Investigate and Prosecute 
Non-Stranger Sexual Assault,” The Voice 3, no. 1 (2009): 9.
39. See Wanjuki, “Believing Victims”; Lonsway et al., “False Reports,” 2; 
and Lisak et al., “False Allegations,” 1318.
40. We might also keep in mind Heidi Breuer’s finding that “as late as 
1321, about 49% of rape victims who reported the crime were themselves 
arrested for false accusations (usually on a legal technicality).” She also 
remarks on the not dissimilar punishment rates for rape cases brought to 
modern and medieval courts: 21.5 percent and 17 percent respectively. See 
Breuer, “Being Intolerant,” 11–12.
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debate on October 9, 2016. Trump himself faced an ever-growing cadre 
of women accusing him of similar assaults.
41
 
Given Trump’s victory, it is worth noting parallels that may be per-
ceived between Cecily Chaumpaigne’s retracted case and two retracted 
cases of Trump’s known at the time of the election. Ivana Trump stated 
under oath in a divorce deposition that Donald Trump raped her in 1989, 
about which reporter Harry Hurt III published an account in his 1993 
book Lost Tycoon: The Many Lives of Donald J. Trump. But (with the 
divorce and, incidentally, the money at stake settled) Hurt was obliged 
by Donald Trump’s lawyers to append a disclaimer they obtained from 
Ivana: “I referred to this as ‘rape,’ but I do not want my words to be 
interpreted in a literal or criminal sense.”
42
Subsequently, in the lead-up to the election, Jane Doe/Katie Johnson 
sued Donald Trump and another for forcibly raping her at age thirteen.
43
 
Doe/Johnson’s complaint alleged that Trump and his co-defendant 
41. The first two women to come forward during the highly charged 
discussions in October 2016 were Jessica Leeds and Rachel Crooks, followed 
by a surge that included People magazine reporter Natasha Stoynoff ’s 
first-hand account. See Meghan Twohey and Michael Barbaro, “Two Women 
Say Donald Trump Touched Them Inappropriately,” New York Times, 12 
October 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/13/us/politics/donald-
trump-women.html?_r=0; and Natasha Stoynoff, “Physically Attacked by 
Donald Trump – a PEOPLE Writer’s Own Harrowing Story,” People, 12 
October 2016, http://people.com/politics/donald-trump-attacked-people-
writer/. Stoynoff writes entirely in the activist-survivor genre, framing her 
account as taking her voice back. She moves from just after the assault (“I was 
still in shock and remained speechless”) to a final interaction where Trump 
tells her she’s great (“Yeah, I thought. I’m great because I kept my mouth shut,”) 
to regret at not publicizing the incident soon after and a sharp statement on 
both Trump’s prior comments on women and her own experience: “Talk is 
talk. But it wasn’t just talk in my case, it was very much action. And, just for 
the record, Mr. Trump, I did not consent.”
42. Harry Hurt III, Lost Tycoon: The Many Lives of Donald J. Trump 
(New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1993; repr., Brattleboro, VT: Echo Point 
Books and Media, 2016), flyleaf. Disclaimer 6 April 1993.
43. The unknown woman filed as Jane Doe in New York but Katie 
Johnson in California in a series of lawsuits.
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threatened her life and the lives of her family members, and furthermore 
that “[b]oth Defendants let Plaintiff know that each was a very wealthy, 
powerful man and indicated that they had the power, ability and means 
to carry out their threats.”
44
 Her attorney announced a press conference 
but then canceled it due to threats to Doe/Johnson. Two days later, on 
November 4, 2016, Doe/Johnson dropped the lawsuit.
45
 This combi-
nation of a formal, legal claim of rape, pressure from influential men 
or payment to the accuser, and the legal retraction of the claim is thus 
associated twice with the highest office in the United States.
46
 
Returning to Chaucer, then, any classroom discussion of Chaump-
aigne needs to balance the ultimately unresolvable nature of the Cecily 
case with sensitivity to students’ individual experiences, neither reinforc-
ing survivors’ fears of being disbelieved nor buttressing concerns that 
accusations now equate to guilty verdicts. Trying the case in absentia 
can fail to facilitate engagement with Chaucer’s literary output, shades 
into either unwarranted speculation or equally unwarranted certainty, 
and treads close to implying that students may themselves be unbeliev-
able—or guilty without benefit of trial. In addition, since 2016, the 
details of the Chaumpaigne case play directly into current partisanship. 
Omitting the Chaumpaigne release from classroom discussions erases 
deep complexities behind Chaucer’s writing.
The theme of consent pervades Chaucer’s oeuvre.47 Most obvious, in 
44. Complaint at 6, Doe v. Trump, No. 1:16-cv-04642-RA (S.D.N.Y. 
dismissed 16 September 2016). 
45. Alan Yuhas, “Woman Who Accused Donald Trump of Raping Her at 
13 Drops Lawsuit,” Guardian, 5 November 2016, https://www.theguardian.
com/us-news/2016/nov/04/donald-trump-teenage-rape-accusations-law-
suit-dropped, accessed 10 January 2017.
46. I note here that neither of these two cases against Trump sought a 
criminal conviction. Further, out of an excess of caution, I note that at the 
time of writing this he has not been convicted of sexual assault. Neither, to 
the best of our knowledge and surviving records, was Chaucer.
47. See William A. Quinn, “The Rapes of Chaucer,” Chaucer Yearbook 5 
(1996): 117. Quinn holds that in the translations of Roman de la Rose and De 
consolatione Philosophiae, Chaucer’s “persistent deliteralizing of rape” suggests 
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light of the Chaumpaigne release, are glib readings of the Wife of Bath’s 
Tale or the Second Nun’s Tale. Portraying Chaucer as the rapist seeking 
redemption or the story of the adamantly virgin Saint Cecelia as an apol-
ogy is uncharacteristically straightforward. Christine M. Rose deems 
Chaucer’s use of attempted or completed sexual violence “astonishingly 
prevalent and varied,” citing a slew of tales: Emelye in the Knight’s Tale, 
Custance in the Man of Law’s Tale, Malyne and her mother in the Reeve’s 
Tale, May’s dubious consent in the Merchant’s Tale, Virginia in the Physi-
cian’s Tale, the wife and daughter in The Tale of Melibee (whose beating 
she reads as legally raptus), Dorigen in the Franklin’s Tale, misogynistic 
murder in the Manciple’s Tale, Troilus and Criseyde, and of course Luc-
rece and Philomel in The Legend of Good Women. She cites a further list 
of those women whose agency is limited: the Wife of Bath herself, the 
wife in the Shipman’s Tale, St. Cecelia, Criseyde, and the formel eagle 
in The Parlement of Foules.48 
I wish to draw further attention to the recurring ambiguities and 
complexities of consent. Criseyde’s wishes and agency are opaque, con-
strained by the suicidal threats and manipulations of Pandarus and Troi-
lus (and, later, by her vulnerable position in the Greek camp).
49
 But 
that “prior to 1380 the literal implications of raptus remained an abstractly 
bookish trope, personally irrelevant and, as such, unreal for Chaucer,” 
followed by a shift in his use of the trope after the Chaumpaigne case. 
Quinn, “The Rapes of Chaucer,” 6. Cf. Carolyn Dinshaw, Chaucer’s Sexual 
Poetics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 11; Allman and 
Hanks, “Rough Love,” 36-65.
48. Rose, “Reading Chaucer,” 49. Rose asks “what it might mean 
heuristically for us to teach rape when we teach Chaucer” in “Reading 
Chaucer,” 25. She calls for us to read rape as actual rape, in addition to 
reading the roles it serves within the text. But at this point the impetus for 
recognizing sexual assault in texts now tends to be pushed by students, on 
their terms, rather than guided by instructors; I am concerned less with 
making sure that students read rape as actual rape than with anticipating 
their doing so, responding, and guiding the subsequent discussion.
49. Juhani Rudanko notes that, in fact, Pandarus’s suicide threat is 
Chaucer’s addition to the story in her article “‘I wol sterve’: Negotiating the 
Issue of a Lady’s Consent in Chaucer’s Poetry,” Journal of Historical 
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Criseyde acts without evident coercion at key moments and speaks of 
her heart. While none of the men in the Franklin’s Tale view exchang-
ing Dorigen as a possible rape, Rose’s reading suggests Dorigen does: 
“Dorigen . . . aligns herself with a cast of chaste characters/predeces-
sors who are victims of real or attempted rape.”
50
 The Miller’s Tale riffs 
off coercion and play. Nicholas initially grabs Alisoun by her parts and 
threatens to die, but Alisoun shows herself to be an active, even glee-
ful participant over the course of the tale. Rape is literary metaphor in 
“Adam Scriveyn.” The Merchant’s Tale has not only May but also her 
patron, the ravysshed yet affectionate wife Proserpina.51 Chaucer returns 
again and again to these scenarios he has so carefully constructed, playing 
out countless nuances of force and consent.
And so how, faced with Chaucer’s literary fixation on the permu-
tations of sexual violence, do we present Chaumpaigne? Perhaps the 
most revolutionary strategy proposed is Susan Signe Morrison’s anti-
biography, a reading of the charges that rejects our Chaucerian focus 
and returns Chaumpaigne’s voice to her.
52
 She covers how past criticism, 
by reflexively or defensively casting doubts on Chaumpaigne’s family, 
character, and motives, problematically reproduces our present responses 
to accusers.
53
 As an activist of the movement I have described earlier, I am 
Pragmatics 5, no. 1 (2004): 152. And Christopher Cannon argues that in 
Troilus and Criseyde, “we can see Chaucer acutely aware of the definitional 
requirements for rape that preoccupy us . . . on the conditions of the 
consent, on the constraints and qualifications that interact with agreement” 
and that later, with the language used around Diomede, we are given enough 
context through Helen to recognize rape even when it is not cited as rape. 
See Cannon, “Chaucer and Rape,” 269 and 270.
50. Rose, “Reading Chaucer,” 48.
51. IV (E) 2230.
52. Susan Signe Morrison, “The Use of Biography in Medieval Literary 
Criticism: The Case of Geoffrey Chaucer and Cecily Chaumpaigne,” Chaucer 
Review 34, no. 1 (1999): 82–83, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25096076.
53. I will join Morrison in finding what we might most mildly dub a lack 
of sensitivity in several pieces of scholarship. She castigates Paull F. Baum for 
not anticipating that readers may be themselves survivors of sexual assault 
(72) and John Gardner for situating his narrator within what is almost a 
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also deeply invested in the project of recuperating women’s and survivors’ 
voices. But while Morrison’s endeavor is a valuable intellectual exercise, 
I cannot see what we can do for non-specialized students with the scant 
few paragraphs she is able to produce. If we are seeking such medieval 
survivor narratives, we can find other and better sources in legal records 
alone. If we are curious about Chaucer and his writing, then—rapist 
or not—we can continue to keep our narrative centered on him while 
encountering only those issues already inherent in the existence of the 
canon, so long as we do not valorize him without cause.
54
Yet the bulk of biographies and analyses do valorize Chaucer. We 
absolve him of guilt by framing the unknown event(s) as an escapade 
or indiscretion. In one of the more benign examples, Derek Pearsall’s 
reasoning leads him to an internally inconsistent charge. He writes, 
“That Chaucer was guilty of something is clear from the care he took to 
secure immunity from prosecution, but”—and here his biography begins 
to contort itself—“it need not have been rape.”
55
 He then exonerates 
Chaucer by conjecturing a scorned Chaumpaigne motivated by com-
pensation, perhaps in revenge for “neglect and the betrayal of promises 
by the man or some unilateral decision on his part to terminate an affair 
that he regarded as over but which the woman, in retrospect, regarded 
as a physical violation.”
56
 Pearsall’s language does not merely play into 
the harmful cliché of false rape accusations from slighted or regretful 
women: he actively cites this cliché through his sudden and atypical 
shift from Chaucer and Cecily into “the man” and “the woman.” His 
unsubstantiated narrative exists within and is reinforced by the context 
of its frequent modern application in discrediting victims. It is, in fact, 
a thoroughly contemporary rape culture narrative, one that fits neatly 
within the fears delineated by Milo Yiannopoulos and his ilk. The dif-
ference between when Pearsall wrote his speculation and now is that a 
parody of the male gaze (73).
54. Earlier, I cited Bill Cosby and Woody Allen as contemporary artists 
whose works are being reassessed in light of allegations against them. One 
immediate and important contrast with these contemporary artists is that 
Chaucer no longer financially profits through the distribution of his work. 
55. Pearsall, The Life of Geoffrey Chaucer, 137.
56. Ibid.
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significant population of our students has been equipped to recognize 
and label such narratives.
Pearsall’s hypotheses are mild compared to the wilder speculations 
about Chaumpaigne. W. W. Skeat cites Lewis, the child dedicatee of the 
Treatise on the Astrolabe, as a possible by-blow of Chaucer and Chaump-
aigne solely on the basis of his age.
57
 If Lewis’s conception was indeed 
rape, then Chaumpaigne may have retracted her legally invalidated accu-
sation, as it was thought that rape could not result in conception.
58
 Hal-
deen Braddy, though condemning Chaucer by agreeing that “the most 
likely construction to place on all the related documents is that the act of 
‘raptus’ by Chaucer actually represented physical rape,” figures Cecily as 
seductive apprentice and stepdaughter of a royal mistress, Alice Perrers.
59
 
Donald Howard follows up on this to cast doubts on Chaumpaigne’s 
relatives and motives. He concedes that raptus seems to mean rape, but 
cavils that at times, “false charges of rape—a very serious crime—were 
brought against a legal adversary to put him at a disadvantage by get-
ting him thrown in prison.”
60
 He adds that if indeed Chaumpaigne’s 
stepmother were Alice Perrers, then Chaumpaigne spent time around a 
57. W. W. Skeat, The Complete Works of Geoffrey Chaucer (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1894), 1.xxxiii, 3.352. Cf. Crow and Olson, Chaucer 
Life-Records, 345; Donald R. Howard, Chaucer: His Life, His Works, His 
World (New York, NY: E. P. Dutton, 1987), 320; Gardner, The Life and Times 
of Chaucer (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), 252–53; and Delany, 
“Strategies of Silence,” 128.
58. Cf. Hiram Kümper, “Learned Men and Skillful Matrons: Medical 
Expertise and the Forensics of Rape in the Middle Ages,” in Medicine and the 
Law in the Middle Ages, ed. Wendy J. Turner and Sara M. Butler (Leiden: 
Brill, 2014), 101-5; James A. Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in 
Medieval Europe (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 450; Joan 
Cadden, Meanings of Sex Difference in the Middle Ages: Medicine, Science and 
Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 93–100; and 
Saunders, “The Medieval Law,” 46–47.
59. Haldeen Braddy, “Chaucer, Alice Perrers, and Cecily Chaumpaigne,” 
Speculum 52, no. 4 (1977): 909, doi:10.2307/2855381. Cf. Harley, “Geoffrey 
Chaucer, Cecilia Chaumpaigne, and Alice Perrers,” 78–82.
60. Howard, Chaucer: His Life, His Works, His World, 318.
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“famous courtesan with few scruples and an excellent head for business; 
if they were on good terms, Cecily may have learned a trick or two from 
her stepmother.”
61
 Finally, he joins Pearsall and the rest of the crowd 
wondering if Chaumpaigne were merely a woman scorned. 
T. F. T. Plucknett, one of the founding members of the club repre-
sented by Pearsall, Braddy, Howard et al., worries with astonishingly 
contemporary language about how “[r]ape is a brutal crime and implies 
a degree of depravity which should make us cautious in fixing such a 
charge. There is really no evidence for it. That he seduced Cecilia we may 
well believe; that she was angry with him, and still more with herself, is 
extremely probable. She may have honestly thought that because it all 
happened against her better judgment, that therefore it was without her 
consent.”
62
 Thus, in short order, and with charged language, Plucknett 
concludes that the rape accusation harms Chaucer, not just on legal 
grounds but in terms of his moral reputation. He dismisses the case on 
the grounds of “really” no evidence. Chaumpaigne becomes the foolish, 
seduced, regretful, and vengeful woman who, in Plucknett’s narrative, 
has twisted the facts around in her own head to absolve herself of sex 
she feels guilt over, the alt-right caricature of the contemporary campus 
woman.
Less accusatory but equally uncomfortable is John Gardner’s writing. 
The thought of giving his description of Chaumpaigne to a contempo-
rary class makes one cringe: “It seems possible, if not downright likely, 
that into his busy schedule of 1379 or ’80 Chaucer managed to fit at least 
one pretty wench.”
63
 Gardner’s language as he delves into the matter 
foreshadows the current fears of misandry and overzealous judgments. 
When he notes the “general principle that a man is innocent until proven 
guilty,”—a principle, again, for courtrooms—he then adds with relief 
that “in this case we will probably never get proof,” and so may mentally 
leave Chaucer innocent.
64
 He juxtaposes these statements with notes 
61. Ibid., 319. It is worth noting among these citations that Chaumpaigne 
frequently figures in scholarship as Cecily, though Chaucer does not appear 
as Geoffrey. This renders her accessible yet diminutive.
62. Plucknett, “Chaucer’s Escapade,” 3.
63. Gardner, The Life and Times of Chaucer, 251.
64. Ibid., 252.
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on Chaucer’s powerful friends, the possibility of actual rape, and the 
chance Chaumpaigne might have been impregnated, and observes that 
the “baker’s daughter, it seems, had no real chance,” before concluding 
on a cheerful note imagining her “pretty and soft” body.
65
 Whether or 
not Chaumpaigne consented to sex with Chaucer, this writing strips 
her bare centuries later.
If the instructor were to eliminate these biographical excerpts from 
prefatory lectures on the Canterbury Tales, it would be nearly impossible 
to teach about the case, particularly to students in introductory courses 
or outside the humanities. The only thorough collection of documents 
is the Chaucer Life-Records, but it omits the reworded release discovered 
by Cannon and remains untranslated from Latin.
The key document on the Close Roll, with Chaumpaigne’s release 
de raptu meo, is in the National Archives at Kew.66 As the Close Roll 
consists of sheets of parchment stitched into a scroll, accessing Chaump-
aigne’s entry involves not only a physical visit or payment to the National 
Archives for a page check, but also fifteen minutes of unrolling the 
scroll. The available transcriptions of all the documents come primarily 
through either the Chaucer Life-Records project or Christopher Can-
non. Thus, for students, engagement with Chaumpaigne’s words tends 
to be mediated through both transcription and translation. The sensitive 
nature of the material and the difficulties with the word raptus make the 
student’s distance from the original document particularly undesirable 
in this case. Not only is Chaumpaigne’s release important as a physical, 
visual record, but editions of it inevitably carry speculation. 
My growing frustration with available pedagogical tools for approach-
ing Chaumpaigne coincided with an opportunity from the Cornell Uni-
versity Library to develop a digital humanities project.
67
 I used this to 
begin chaumpaigne.org with the goal of providing minimally mediated 
student access to the primary documents and context.
68
 The project 
65. Ibid., 252–53.
66. Specifically, C 54/219 (Close R. 219, 3 Ric. II, m. 9 d).
67. I need to recognize here Virginia Cole, Madeleine Casad, Susette 
Newberry, Chloe McLaren, Mia Tootill, Andy Galloway, and John Wyatt 
Greenlee for supporting the project and tutoring me on various components.
68. Anna Waymack, De raptu meo, Summer 2016, chaumpaigne.org.
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publishes a timeline containing the documents, including a marker for 
the lost original release. Each existing document has both Latin tran-
scription and English translation. Furthermore, the Close Roll release 
of May 4 includes a photographic reproduction of the original docu-




In this way I have been able to present students with pared-down 
materials and the closest experience possible to the documents them-
selves. I cannot, of course, divorce this project from an ideological stance, 
but hope to preserve the case’s ambiguities. This means, for example, 
removing an early image of St. Cecilia on Chaumpaigne’s biography 
page, and then subsequently weighing the ethics of depicting Chaucer 
visually but not Chaumpaigne.
One rejoinder is that the import of maintaining ambiguity around the 
Chaumpaigne case has already been addressed. In a pedagogical medita-
tion, Tison Pugh exposes his own and his students’ wrestling with the 
discomforts of reading and appreciating a potential rapist’s work. He 
recounts one student grateful for the unknowable verdict of Chaucer’s 
case, allowing her to continue liking Chaucer in the absence of evidence 
of guilt.
70
 Downplaying the scholarly role of the personal for himself, he 
nonetheless recognizes his students’ “personal investment in literature” 
as a necessary albeit uncritical part of the classroom.
71
 But throughout 
his discussion of the ethics of teaching Chaucer, Pugh clings adamantly 
to the ambiguity of the case for both his students and himself, labeling it 
an “easy escape” that we have no certainty and thus “we need not face the 
uncomfortable ethical situation of enjoying the delightful literature of a 
69. A future goal—with support, again, from the Cornell University 
Library—is to adapt existing tools such that I can overlay the Latin letters, 
expanded transcription, or English transliteration atop the image. This twins 
with my goal of obtaining photographs of the remaining documents, some of 
which have been unavailable. In this I agree with and further Green’s 
insistence that we recognize and begin with the physicality of the quitclaim: 
“Cecily Champain v. Geoffrey Chaucer,” 261.





 This permits him to, in his teaching, “implicitly 
endorse Chaucer the man.”
73
 He proposes his assignment of an optional 
research paper topic: personal responses to Chaucer through an ethical 
framework.
74
 This assignment is meant to permit and encourage empa-
thy with Chaucer, even Chaucer-the-potential-rapist.
75
What I challenge here is that the ambiguity we have offers an easy 
escape. Ambiguity has become (if it ever, indeed, were not) highly 
charged and uncomfortable. Our students are less inclined to accept this 
ambiguity than ever before. And yet, paradoxically, students have the 
vocabulary for the ambiguities and complexities of consent even as they 
take these more polarized stances. We all want resolution—just look 
to Pearsall’s comment that “the temptation to offer an explanation is 
too strong to resist”—but our students are to a new degree accustomed 
to—albeit unhappy with—uncertainty.
76
 They have been positioned in 
the epicenter of our shifting definitions of consent (e.g., the movement 
from “no means no” to “yes means yes”), have led our increased use of 
trial by social media, and have been cast, on both sides, as the primary 
victims: the preyed-upon women on “the hunting ground” of college 
campuses or the slandered young men destroyed by false accusations.
77
 
And so we occupy a rich moment to truly acknowledge past and 
present ambiguity: that even with regards to its legal meaning, raptus is 
elusive; that our permanently incomplete record here carries the same 
absences and intangibilities as modern cases; and that for so many of 





76. Pearsall, The Life of Geoffrey Chaucer, 137.
77. This article is, it seems, the rare Chaucerian work that risks becoming 
outdated even before publication. That said, the openly gendered and 
politicized tension regarding campus rape culture, privilege, narratives, and 
evidence will scarcely disappear overnight; these cultural and historical 
developments in America from 2011 to the beginning of 2017 have deeply 
imprinted our students’ attitudes towards and conceptualization of sexual 
assault.
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we substitute discourse in place of witnesses and evidence.
78
 All of these 
work together, rendering actual (as opposed to literary) rapes unread-
able and offering instead these discourses of accusation, speculation, 
retaliation, testimony, hearsay, whisper networks, gossip, retelling, and 
reimagining. An option in teaching Chaumpaigne, then, is to set ground 
rules keeping the classroom discussion from turning to trial or verdict, 
and by so doing align the case with the current intricacies around sexual 
assault and accusations that students must already maneuver around 
constantly. In short, in classroom discussions, I urge us to resist that 
temptation to offer an explanation. Instead, let Chaumpaigne’s case 
stand in parallel with the many unresolved accusations students have 
already read, seen, and experienced. The question for students, or even 
the question for us as scholars in the absence of further evidence, must 
not be whether Chaucer raped Chaumpaigne but rather what this inac-
cessible background means for reading Chaucer.
Cornell University
78. We also substitute discourse regardless of witnesses. See, for example, 
Turner’s victim’s incisive account of what people advised her afterwards, 
despite her two eyewitnesses: “[Turner] can say whatever he wants and no 
one can contest it. I had no power, I had no voice, I was defenseless. My 
memory loss would be used against me. My testimony was weak, was 
incomplete...His attorney constantly reminded the jury, the only one we can 
believe is Brock, because she doesn’t remember.” Baker, “Here Is The 
Powerful Letter.”
